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We present a method to add dependability features to component-based software systems.
The method is applicable if the dependability features add new behavior to the system,
but do not change its basic functionality. The idea is to start with a software architecture
whose central component is an application component that implements the behavior of the
system in the normal case. The application component is connected to other components,
possibly through adapters. It is then possible to enhance the system by adding dependability
features in such a way that the central application component remains untouched. Adding
dependability features necessitates to evolve the overall system architecture by replacing or
newly introducing hardware or software components. The adapters contained in the initial
software architecture have to be modified, whereas the other software components need not
to be changed. Thus, the dependability of a component-based system can be enhanced in an
incremental way.
1 Introduction
Component orientation is a new paradigm for the development of software-based systems. The
basic idea is to assemble the software by combination of pre-fabricated parts (called software
components), instead of developing it from scratch. This procedure resembles the construction
methods applied in other engineering disciplines, such as civil or mechanical engineering.
Software components are put together by connecting their interfaces. A provided interface of
one component can be connected with a required interface of another component if the provided
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interface offers the services needed to implement the required interface. An adapter is often
necessary to map the provided services to the required ones.
Hence, an appropriate description of the provided and required interfaces of a software com-
ponent is crucial for component-based development. In earlier papers [13, 19, 24], we have inves-
tigated how to formally specify interfaces of software components and how to demonstrate their
interoperability, using the formal method B.
In the present paper, we study how dependability features [4], such as safety, security or fault
tolerance features, can be added to component-based software. The goal is to retain the initial
software components as far as possible and only add new software components in a systematic
way. This approach works out if the initial software architecture is structured in such a way that
the core functionality is clearly separated from auxiliary functionality that is needed to connect
the components implementing the core functionality to their environment.
To make a software-based system more dependable, new components are added, or existing
components are replaced by more dependable ones, while the core functionality remains the same.
New or modified interfaces must be taken into account. In order to connect these new interfaces to
the given interfaces of “core” components, new adapters must be developed, or existing adapters
must be upgraded. These adapters “shield” the core components by intercepting and possibly
modifying their inputs and outputs.
In Section 2 we describe how we support component-based development using the formal
specification language B. We then describe our method to add dependability features in Section 3.
The method is illustrated by the case study of an access control system, presented in Section 4.
The paper closes with the discussion of related work in Section 5 and concluding remarks in
Section 6.
2 Using B for Component-Based Development
We first briefly describe the formal language B and then explain how we use B in the context of
component-based software. We formally express provided and required interfaces using B models
in order to verify their compatibility.
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2.1 The Formal Method B
B is a formal software development method based on set theory, which supports an incremental
development process using refinement [1]. Starting out from a textual description, a development
begins with the definition of an abstract model, which can be refined step by step until an im-
plementation is reached. The refinement of models is a key feature for incrementally developing
more and more detailed models, preserving correctness in each step.
The method B has been successfully applied in the development of several complex real-life
applications, such as the METEOR project [6]. It is one of the few formal methods which has
robust and commercially available support tools for the entire development life-cycle, from spec-
ification down to code generation [7]. The B method provides structuring primitives that allow
one to compose models in various ways. Large systems can be specified in a modular way and in
an object-based manner [23, 21]. Proofs of invariance and refinement are part of each develop-
ment. The proof obligations are generated automatically by support tools such as AtelierB [31]
or B4free [14], an academic version of AtelierB. Checking proof obligations with B support tools
is an efficient and practical way to detect errors introduced during development.
2.2 Specifying Component Architectures
We define component-based systems using different kinds of UML 2.0 diagrams [25]:
• Composite structure diagrams serve to express the overall architecture of the system in terms
of components and their required and provided interfaces.
• Class diagrams serve to express interface data models with their different attributes and
methods. An interface data model specifies the data that are passed via a given interface.
• The usage protocol of each interface can be modeled by a Protocol State Machine (PSM).
• Sequence diagrams serve to express the interactions between different components that are
connected via some interface.
Component interfaces are then specified as B models, which increases confidence in the de-
veloped systems: the correctness of the specifications, as well as correctness of the subsequent
refinement process can be checked with tool support. In an integrated development process, the

























PRE turnstile = locked
THEN turnstile := unlocked
END;
lock =
PRE turnstile = unlocked
THEN turnstile := locked
END
END
Figure 2: B model of the interface TS P
Let us give an example of a software component called TurnstileDriver, presented in Figure 1. It
represents a software component that can lock and unlock a turnstile. This component has two
interfaces, a provided one TS P and a required one TS R. These interfaces express that another
component, connected to TurnstileDriver, can call the lock() and unlock() methods of TS P, but the
TurnstileDriver can reciprocally call a pushed() method from the connected component when the
turnstile is pushed. A B model of the interface TS P is given in Figure 2.
2.3 Proving Interoperability of Component Interfaces
In component-based architectures, the components must be connected in an appropriate way. To
guarantee interoperability of components, we must consider each connection of a provided and
a required interface contained in a software architecture and try to show that the interfaces are
compatible. Using the method B, we prove that the provided interface is a correct B refinement
of the required interface. This means that the provided interface constitutes an implementation
of the required interface, and we can conclude that the two components can be connected as
intended. The process of proving interoperability between components is described in [13].
Often, to construct a working component architecture, adapters have to be defined, connecting
the required interfaces to the provided ones. An adapter is a new component that realizes the
required interface using the provided interface. At the signature level, it expresses the mapping
between required and provided variables. In [24], we have studied an adapter specification and its
verification by giving a B refinement of the adaptation that refines the B model of the required
interface and includes the provided (previously incompatible) interface.
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3 Adding Dependability Features to Component-Based Soft-
ware
We now describe our method to add dependability features to a software-based system, whose
software part makes use of component technology. Dependability is the ability to deliver services
that can justifiably be trusted. In particular, we consider dependability properties concerning
security, safety, and fault tolerance. The latter two are relevant mainly for embedded systems,
where some part of the physical world has to be controlled, whereas security is an issue also in
pure data-processing systems.
The basic idea of our method is to leave the core functionality of the system untouched, and
enhance dependability by
• adding dedicated components needed for realizing dependability features, or replacing used
components by more dependable ones;
• constructing and/or upgrading software adapter components that connect the new “depend-
ability components” with the existing (and unchanged) “core” components.
In the following, we first describe the situations where our method can profitably be applied.
Then, we describe how the different kinds of dependability properties can be added.
3.1 Application Scenario
Our method is intended to support the following scenario. We start out with a component-
based system that implements a given “core” functionality, for example, controlling access of
persons to a building. In the software architecture of the system, one or more components (called
application components) can be identified that implement the core functionality. This functionality
is clearly separated from the functionality of the other components, serving for example to connect
the core to the environment (hardware drivers). An example of such a software architecture
is given in Figure 3. It shows a layered architecture with a core component called Application,
which is connected to other software components called SmartcardDriver, NetworkDatabaseDriver and
TurnstileDriver, possibly using adapters.
The core components should be robust to changes: their core functionality is to be left un-
changed. Their connections to other components in terms of provided and required interfaces are
not evolved. This means that enhancing dependability amounts to providing additional behavior
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that has to be executed in case of hazardous conditions, hardware or software failures, or security
attacks. The system behavior in the normal case, however, remains the same. Instead of changing
the core components, we evolve the adapters independently of the core components by providing
additional functionality and dependability features.
One reason for leaving the core components untouched may be that the core components should
be reusable in different contexts, where dependability need not always be an issue. Another reason
may be that they cannot be changed, because they have been produced by a third party and the
source code is not accessible.
3.2 General Procedure
Adding dependability features to a given system means to adapt the system to new (depend-
ability) requirements. The new dependability requirements may override existing (functional)
requirements. For example, a functional requirement for an access control system may be that
exactly the persons are admitted to a building who are authorized to be in the building. To find
out if a person has permission, a database is queried. A new security requirement might state that
if the database is corrupted, nobody is admitted any more, even if they are authorized according to
the database. The new requirements are realized by updating existing adapters or developing new
adapters. The adapters shield the application components by intercepting and possibly modifying
their inputs and outputs.
In general, we proceed as follows:
1. Express the new dependability requirements.
2. Express how the new requirements are related to the old ones and among each other.
3. For each dependability requirement, state what components are needed for ensuring it. In-
spect the given system architecture and decide what new components are necessary, and
what components must be replaced or updated.
4. Update the existing adapters and implement new dependability adapters that connect the
core components to the other components.
5. If several dependability adapters are added, it may be suitable to add one or more core
components that handle the new dependability-relevant events.
We use the B method for specifying component interfaces and implementing adapters (and
possibly new core components). First, we can ensure that the components (existing ones and
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newly introduced ones) can indeed be plugged together as intended (see Section 2.3). Second, the
adapter and application specifications expressed in B can be refined until code is reached.
In the following sections, we describe how to add security, safety and fault-tolerance features.
We do not invent any new mechanisms but show how standard solutions for the given dependability
requirements can be added to a component-based system in an incremental way.
3.3 Adding Security Features
Security is mostly concerned with confidentiality, integrity, and availability. More concrete security
features concern for example authenticity and non-repudiation. In the context of our method,
availability is considered to be a fault-tolerance property; mechanisms for enhancing availability
are described in Section 3.5.
When adding security features to a component-based system, the corresponding adapters will
often implement the secure (i.e., confidential and integrity-preserving) transmission of data. Typ-
ical tasks that have to be performed include:
• checking message authentication codes to ensure integrity
• encrypt or decrypt data to ensure confidentiality
• check credentials to ensure authenticity
Existing security components may be used to realize the required security functionality.
3.4 Adding Safety Features
Safety requirements concern the reaction to hazardous situations in the environment of the system
(for example, fire in a building). In these cases, the system must be put into a safe state. The
safety adapters must be connected to new external components that make it possible to detect a
hazardous situation. Furthermore, they must implement a transition to a safe state, because this
cannot be done by the application components. What can be considered to be a safe state cannot
be stated in general but depends on the specificities of the given system.
3.5 Adding Fault-Tolerance Features
A standard technique to achieve fault tolerance is to introduce redundant components. Two kinds
of fault-tolerance features have to be distinguished. A component-based system can be composed
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of active or passive components. An active component can inform its environment when a failure
occurs. In contrast, passive components just fail without informing the environment.
To achieve tolerance with respect to active components, the adapter must be able to shutdown
the failed component when it is informed of the failure and switch to a redundant one. To achieve
fault tolerance with respect to passive components, the adapter must check if the component works
correctly, or if a failure has occurred. In such a case, the adapter must take the faulty component
out of service and handle the fault, e.g. by switching to a redundant component.
4 Case Study
We illustrate our method with the case study of a simple access control system, which controls
the access to a building [2]. Persons who are authorized to enter the building are equipped with a
smartcard on which a user identification is stored. The access control system queries a database
to obtain the information if the person is permitted to enter the building. If access is granted, a
turnstile located at the entrance is unblocked, so that the person can enter the building. At the
exit of the building, another turnstile is installed. It is always unblocked and only serves to count
the number of persons who have left the building.
In its initial version, the access control system contains no dependability features. Using
our method described in Section 3, we will add two dependability features to the system by
adding appropriate new components, however leaving the basic functionality untouched. The
first dependability feature concerns security. Using message authentication codes, it is checked
if unauthorized modifications of the database content have occurred. In this case, the person
who wants enter to the building is not admitted, and a facility service is notified. The second
dependability feature concerns safety. A fire detector is added to the system. In case of fire, the
reaction is the following: nobody is allowed to enter the building until the fire is dealt with, and
the facility service is notified.
4.1 Architecture of the System without Dependability Features
The access control system communicates with hardware components (a smartcard reader and the
turnstiles), as well as software components (the database). The controller software of the access
control system is named TurnstileController. Its software architecture is shown in Figure 3, using
the syntax of UML composite structure diagrams. Software components are represented as named
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boxes, and the interfaces between them are represented by “sockets” (required interfaces) and















ND_P TS_R TS_P TS_R TS_P
Smartcard Reader Database Entry Turnstile Exit Turnstile
Figure 3: Software architecture for the TurnstileController
The software architecture of the TurnstileController is a layered one. The highest layer, i.e., the
Application component, implements the core functionality of the access control system. The lowest
layer consists of the software drivers that connect the software to the hardware components. A
driver comes with the hardware components and should not be modified. Hence, adapters may be
necessary to connect the application component to the software drivers. These adapters make up
the middle layer of the architecture.
Figure 4 shows the interfaces of the Application component in more detail. For each required
and each provided interface, an interface class is specified in UML notation. The interface class
shows the operations belonging to the interface, together with their parameters. For example, the
interface class Ap P Sm describes a provided interface of Application: it expresses that Application
implements one method, namely card inserted(uid), which has a user identifier uid as its parameter.
This method may be called by another component connected to the interface Ap P Sm.
The access control system uses three kinds of external components, namely a smartcard reader,
a network database, and two copies of a turnstile. The corresponding drivers that control these
components are named SmartcardDriver, NetworkDatabaseDriver and TurnstileDriver, respectively. Their
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Figure 5: Components used by the TurnstileController
4.1.1 The DBAdapter
As an example of an adapter, we explain the DBAdapter. Figure 6 gives a scenario of its be-
havior. The Application calls one of its required methods, namely has permission(uid,did), which
must be implemented by DBAdapter. Parameters of the method are a user identification uid and
a door identification did. As is shown in Figure 5, the database driver offers an operation getB-
DEntry(uid,did), which yields a permission and a message authentication code as its result. To
implement has permission(uid,did), the DBAdapter just calls the method getBDEntry(uid,did) and re-







Figure 6: Sequence diagram for the DBAdapter
As Figure 4 shows, the required interface Ap R DB of Application has to be implemented, i.e.,
an implementation of the operation has permission(uid,did) has to be provided. This is achieved by
the DBAdapter component, which uses the provided interface ND P. In Figure 7, we show how the
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corresponding B models are organized. To verify the correctness of the assembly, we specify a B















Figure 7: B architecture for the DBAdapter
4.2 Adding Dependability Features to the Access Control System
We now add two dependability features to the system, one for security and one for safety. We also
introduce a new core component called Safety / Security / Service Application that handles security-
and safety-related events by notifying the facility service. To realize the dependability features, we
must introduce tree new components: Secret, FacilityServiceDriver and FireDetectorDriver. Descriptions
of the interfaces of these components are given in Figure 8. The resulting new software architecture
is shown in Figure 9.
4.2.1 The SecurityAdapter
The security feature concerns the integrity of the database. Its content is now checked using a
message authentication code (MAC). The new component Secret is introduced for storing secrets
that are needed to check the MAC.
The DBAdapter that connects the Application to the database is changed to use the component
Secret. It is renamed to SecurityAdapter. A behavioral scenario is presented in Figure 10: the
SecurityAdapter still receives a call of the method has permission(uid,did) from the Application. It still
queries the database. But now, the SecurityAdapter checks the message authentication code for
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Figure 9: Software architecture for the dependable TurnstileController















Figure 10: Sequence diagram for the SecurityAdapter
Here, we see that the new security requirement has a higher priority than the initial functional
requirement: if a manipulation of the database is detected, then the access is denied even to
persons that normally have permission to enter the building.
The B architecture of SecurityAdapter is given in Figure 11. Again, the required interface
Ap R DB has to be implemented, however this time not only using the provided interface ND P,
but also the provided interfaces S P of Secret, and SSS P SeA of Safety / Security / Service Application.
We give the B specification of the SecurityAdapter in Figure 12. The OPERATIONS section








































permi ← has permission(uid, did) =
VAR mac, checked IN
permi, mac ← getDBEntry(uid, did) ;
checked ← is signature ok(uid, did, permi, mac) ;






Figure 12: B model of the SecurityAdapter
provided by the included interfaces. Using the B models, we formally prove that the assembly
correctly implements the requirements.
4.2.2 The SafetyAdapter
The safety feature we add to the system concerns the reaction to fire. If a fire occurs, the entry
turnstile must remain blocked: nobody is allowed to enter the building until the fire is extinguished
(we assume the fire brigade uses another entry). Here, the adapter EntryAdapter has to be changed
to receive messages from the fire detector. It is renamed to SafetyAdapter. The SafetyAdapter blocks
the entry turnstile in case of a fire and informs the Safety / Security / Service Application.
Figure 13 shows two sequence diagrams concerning the SafetyAdapter, one for normal behavior,
the other explaining the safety reaction of the adapter when it receives a fire detected call: the
turnstile will be locked until the fire alert is canceled. Here, we see an example of how signals from
the application component are intercepted: the unblock signals of the Application are not passed on
to the entry turnstile; hence, it remains blocked.
Figures 14 and 15 show how the SafetyAdapter is specified in B. It implements the interfaces











































































Figure 14: B architecture for the SafetyAdapter
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model called SafetyAdapter abs is needed for technical reasons: a B model can only refine a single












entry ∈ ENTRY STATES
∧ (turnstile = locked ⇒
entry ∈ {blocked, fireDetected})



















IF entry 6= fireDetected
THEN













Figure 15: B model of the SafetyAdapter
We do not describe the new application component Safety / Security / Service Application in detail.
It serves to pass on a security or safety alarm to the facility service, and it receives a message from
the facility service when the alarm is canceled.
With this case study, we have shown how dependability features can be added to a component-
based system in a modular manner. Other dependability features could be added to the access
control system in the same way. Examples are an authentication mechanism for the smartcard
interface, a redundant arrangement of fire detectors, or checking for memory errors.
5 Related Work
A lot of studies have already been done on component-based approaches. Beugnard et al. [8]
propose to define contracts for components, distinguishing four levels of contracts: syntactic, be-
havioral, synchronization, and quality of service. They do not introduce data models for interfaces,
and it cannot easily be checked if two components can be combined. Roshandel and Medvidociv
[29] propose to specify four different views of software components, namely the interface, static
behavior, dynamic behavior, and interaction protocol views. To ensure dependability, the consis-
tency of the different views is checked. Cheesman and Daniels [12] propose a process to specify
component-based software, which starts with an informal requirements description and produces
an architecture showing the components to be developed or reused, their interfaces and their
dependencies. This approach follows the principle of design by contract [22].
Canal et al. [11] use a subset of the polyadic π-calculus to deal with component interoperability
only at the protocol level. The π-calculus is well suited for describing component interactions. The
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limitation of this approach is the low-level description of the used language and its minimalistic
semantics. Bastide et al. [5] use Petri nets to specify the behavior of CORBA objects, including
operation semantics and protocols. The difference to our approach is that we take into account the
invariants of the interface specifications. Zaremski and Wing [34] propose an interesting approach
to compare two software components. It is determined whether one component can be substituted
for another. They use formal specifications to model the behavior of components and the Larch
prover to prove the specification matching of components. Others [18, 32] have also proposed
to enrich component interface specifications by providing information at signature, semantic and
protocol levels. Henzinger and Alfaro [3] propose an approach allowing the verification of interfaces
interoperability based on automata and game theories: this approach is well suited for checking
the interface compatibility at the protocol level.
The above approaches do not consider adapters. Concerning component adaptation, several
proposals have already been made. Some practice-oriented studies have been devoted to analyze
different issues when one is faced to the adaptation of a third-party component [17]. A formal
foundation of the notions of interoperability and component adaptation is set up in [33]. Compo-
nent behavior specifications are given by finite state machines, which are well known and support
simple and efficient verification techniques for the protocol compatibility.
Braccalia et al. [9, 10] specify an adapter as a set of correspondences between methods and
parameters of the required and provided components. The adapter is formalized as a set of
properties expressed in π-calculus. From this specification and from both interfaces, they generate
a concrete implementable adapter. Reussner and Schmidt present adapters in the context of
concurrent systems. They consider only a certain class of protocol interoperability problems and
generate adapters for bridging component protocol incompatibilities, using interface described by
finite parameterized state machines [30, 28].
In contrast to the above approaches, we prefer to use the B method, because it allows us to
not only consider component compatibility at the protocol level, but also at the signature and
semantic levels, and because of its tool support.
A general approach to wrappers for common security concerns is described in [16]. Popov et
al. [26] show that wrappers are components that monitor and ensure the non-functional proper-
ties at interfaces between components. They improve dependability by adding fault tolerance.
Prospective wrappers are a way of structuring the provision of standard fault-tolerance functions,
such as error detection, confinement and recovery, plus the less common function of preventing
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failures, in a component-based design where dependability is a concern. In [15], the authors pro-
pose to structure fault-tolerant component-based systems that use off-the-shelf components, at
the architectural level, using constructs similar to the multi-versioning connector [27].
In contrast to the above approaches, our method stresses the methodological aspects of evolving
a given component-based system to make it more dependable. In an earlier paper [20], we have
addressed to problem of adding features to component-based systems. But there, we did not use
the B method, and the newly integrated features did not concern dependability, but the addition
of new functionality.
6 Conclusions
The success of the component-construction paradigm in mechanical and electrical engineering
has led to calls for its adoption in software development. We have described a method to add
dependability features to component-based software systems. We start from an initial software
architecture describing the system for the normal case. Dependability is then enhanced in an
incremental way, by modifying adapter components and possibly adding new adapter or new
application components.
Using the formal method B and its refinement and assembling mechanisms to model the com-
ponent interfaces and the adapters, we pay special attention to the question of guaranteeing the
interoperability between the different components. The B prover guarantees that the adapter
is a correct implementation of the required functionalities in terms of the existing components.
With this approach, the verification of the interoperability between the connected components is
achieved at the signature, the semantic and the protocol levels.
In summary, the advantages of our approach are the following:
• Dependability features can be added one by one, as needed.
• The necessary changes to the software architecture are local; the functionality for the normal
case is not changed.
• The core components and the dependability features can be further evolved independently
of each other.
• Our method gives guidance on how the addition of dependability features can be performed
in a systematic way.
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• Using B, it can be checked that the components of the evolved software architecture indeed
interoperate as intended.
• The B specifications of the new or evolved software components can be used as the starting
point of an implementation. For this purpose, the B refinement mechanism can be used.
In this way, we have proposed a “dependable” process for making component-based systems
more dependable.
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